However, I argue that it is a political attitude and as such is, up to some extent, endogenous to the political process: My contention is that a deep political change, such as a regime change, may require a reconstruction of the nationalising policies and discourses set up by the elites, that will, in turn, modify the individuals' attitudes towards the nation.
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To test this hypothesis I focus on the Spanish case, given that there has recently been a regime change and we have survey data that covers reasonably well the period of transition and democratic consolidation. Moreover, as I show below, Spain is a clear case in which the new democratic elites had to adapt the contents of the State-led nationalism in order to accommodate it to the new context, given the strong ideological, religious and cultural biases of the previous regime.
In the first section I discuss the role of national pride as a fundamental component of the political support framework, and advance some theoretical arguments that support my hypothesis. In the second one, I briefly review the Spanish case, and the evolution of the Spanish nationalist discourses during, and after the transition to the democracy. In the third section, I further refine the hypothesis and discuss the causal mechanisms linking each of my main variables of interest with national pride. In the fourth one I present the data, variables and measures used in the analysis, and the next one is the empirical analysis itself. The sixth section is devoted to the discussion of the results and the presentation of the main conclusions that stem from them.
1.-Regime change, nationhood reconstruction and national identities' shift
There seems to be a general agreement on the literature around the idea that identification with the political community is an essential attitude for a country, as long as it may provide "reservoir of diffuse support that can maintain a political system through temporary periods of political stress" (Dalton 1998, p. 19) . 2 This is so because it grants support for the state beyond the institutional setting of a given moment and, thus, could be the basis for loyalty to the state despite a regime change.
Therefore, the development of a generalized affective attachment to the nation must be (and, indeed, has been) a primary concern of any State wishing to last for long.
The wide literature on nation-building processes has clearly shown how the states have developed nationalising policies in order to grant this diffuse support from its citizens, acting as active agencies of national socialisation. The mechanisms used by these policies are educational systems, presence of national symbols in everyday life, development and spread of national languages, etc. In normal conditions, consolidated democracies do not engage in explicitly nationalistic mobilisation of the population, but even in those cases, there are several daily mechanisms to reproduce nationhood, that have been labelled as "banal nationalism" by Michael Billig (1995) .
However, a deep change in the social or institutional structure of a country (such as a regime change or a massive settlement of immigrants, for example) may imply a shift in the orientation of the nationalising policies, in order to adapt them to the new context. This new orientation of the policies and discourses, alongside with the changes in the object itself (the nation), are aimed at modifying citizens' perception and attitudes This may seem incongruent with the idea that attachment to the nation is a sort of reservoir of support for the state beyond the specific institutional setting of a given moment. But we must consider that States and elites do not limit themselves to telling their citizens what nation they have to identify with, but also aim at influencing people on how they have to think that nation and their belonging to it. In normal democratic conditions, the 'official' version of nationhood tends to be constructed in such a way that it can accommodate, at least, the mainstream of the ideological spectrum of the country; but this is not the case in most authoritarian regimes, that tend to monopolise the patriotism. 3 The monopolisation of patriotism is a process of identification between the ruling group (the regime) and the nation in itself (Bar-Tal 1997) that therefore implies a close linkage between attachment to the nation and conformity with the monopolistic group or regime.
When the monopolistic regime breaks up, the new institutions and elites must reconstruct patriotism in order to adapt it to the new context. We must keep in mind that nationalism as an ideology has as its main goal influencing individuals' attitudes towards the nation by fostering attachment with a given nation and a given nationess. So, in addition to the studies on the elites discourses and motivations, research on nationalism must turn its view to the individual level in order to capture the effects of these shifts in the nationalising discourses and policies in actually transforming individuals' attitudes towards the nations. The general hypothesis that stems from that is that different regimes will develop different kinds of nationalising policies and discourses, that will exert varying influences on the configuration of the citizens' attitudes towards the nation.
This can be easily illustrated in the case of the members of cultural and national minorities inside a state, that can be recognised, assimilated or marginalized by different models of nationalising policies and discourses. Confronted to these alternative nationalising models, the members of the minorities will develop different attitudes and strategies, that we could summarise in the famous Hirschman's trichotomy of exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970) . This may also hold for other kinds of groups and, in general, the population of a state: despite a general identification with, or sense of belonging to the nation, the degree of affective attachment with it will depend on the specific foundations of these policies and discourses. For example, if they include ideological or religious biases, we must expect these biases to be reproduced at the individual level, and, therefore citizens with congruent religious or ideological F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 6 backgrounds will develop more intense attachment to a nation defined in these terms. If this is true, then, when the contents of the discourses and policies change, so will do the citizens attitudes. This is precisely the process that I aim at empirically reconstructing in this article by analysing the case of Spain.
2.-Transition to democracy and redefinition of nationhood in Spain
Spain has experienced deep social and political changes in the last decades. The authoritarian and strongly nationalist regime of Franco was followed by the consolidation of a democratic regime that took the form of a constitutional monarchy and a highly decentralized institutional setting, as stated in the 1978 Constitution. The new Spanish democracy adhered less than one decade later to the EEC. Since then, Spain has experienced the longest democratic period in its history, and an increasing convergence with Europe in terms of economic development.
A central issue faced by the Spanish transition to democracy was, undoubtedly, the so-called 'national question', that had also been crucial during the second Republic and the 1936-39 civil war. In parallel with the democratisation process, the definition of the Spanish nation had to evolve from the traditionalist national-Catholicism of the regime towards a new, democratic and inclusive conception of nationhood: after forty years of strong nationalist dictatorship, the common wisdom stated that the democratisation of Spain and the resolution of the conflicts with peripheral (mainly Catalan and Basque) nationalisms were intimately united. The recognition of the internal diversity of Spain, and the decentralisation of the State required a deep redefinition of the Spanish nationhood in itself. The long-lasting debates on this issue during the constituent period are enough to assess its crucial role during the transition years (for a detailed account, see Bastida 1998) . and rejected any recognition of its internal plurality, mainly by reducing the cultural differences to mere folkloristic expressions of regional specificities (Saz 2003; Muro and Quiroga 2005) . while the renewed, democratic Spanish nationalism had to promote attachment to the nation among all the citizens beyond their religious, ideological or territorial backgrounds. This is why, to test the hypothesis, I will trace the evolution of the impact of ideology, religion and region on national pride.
At the beginning of the democratic period I expect a significant influence of these variables on Spaniards' national pride: the right-wing identifiers, the catholics and the residents in regions without a distinct cultural background are expected to show higher levels of pride. And, if an integrative version of Spanish nationalism had successfully developed affective attachment among its citizens, we should also find a progressive reduction in the impact of these variables on the degree of national pride as the time goes on and the Spanish democracy becomes progressively consolidated.
The basic model I suggest, then, is as follows:
The argument expressed by the formula is that I expect national pride to be a function of ideology, religion, region and cohort, but -and this is my main point-, I also expect the coefficients that link ideology, catholicism and region with national pride However, the mechanisms underlying the relationship among these explanatory factors and national pride may not be so simple, and we should also consider alternative explanations that may be affecting it. We cannot assume the influence of ideology, religion and region on national pride to be exclusively due to 'domestic' mechanisms related to the specific configuration of Spanish nationalism.
On one hand, a certain bias of the right towards nationalism, and the left towards 'internationalism' may be a more general phenomenon. On the other hand, majoritarian religion as a tying bond among members of a nation has been an important criterion of in-group demarcation in many countries, given that religion may act as any other cultural marker used to distinguish among members and non-members of the group. So my expectation is not a complete extinction of the impact of ideology and religion on national pride, but rather a significant weakening of it.
The case of the culturally distinct regions is even more complex. Several comparative studies have established that members of minority ethno-national groups do not tend to develop strong tights with the state (Smith and Jarkko 1998) , especially when it is controlled by a "titular" group that alienates minorities from it, as it was the case with the francoist Spain, that could be labelled as a 'nationalising state' (Brubaker 1996) . The decentralization of the state and the official recognition of minority languages had, as one of its main aims, the goal of integrating the minorities in the "new" Spain, but there are two phenomena that make me to be cautious about this expectation: on one hand, the continuous conflicts between peripheral nationalisms and the state that give a sense of incompleteness of this process of redefinition. Some (Muro and Quiroga, 2004; Núñez Seixas, Xosé Manoel, 2001 ) have interpreted these conflicts as an enduring trait of the Spanish nationalism.
On the other hand, alongside with the reinstauration of democracy, the process of decentralisation in Spain permitted the institutionalisation of the alternative minority nationalisms, that in Catalonia and the Basque Country soon reached the control of the newly established autonomous governments, and developed certain policies leading to an 'alternative nation-building' process, opposed to the Spanish one (Linz 1973 ). These alternative nation-building processes, if successful, will make residents in these territories (especially younger cohorts) to feel less attached to Spain as a nation than their counterparts in the rest of Spain (Martínez-Herrera 2002) . This process could counter-balance, up to some extent, the integrative effects of a new version of Spanish nationalism vis à vis national minorities. So there are, at least, two processes going on simultaneously that may be affecting the relationship between the variables in opposed directions, that could counter-balance each other.
Cohort analysis
To understand the dynamics of change and formation of national pride, I also consider the generation variable in the analysis. Through cohort analysis, I intend to approach the issue of how -and when-national pride is constructed and to what extent it is a stable or unstable attitude. The reconstruction of nationhood at the elite level may have not been able to modify attitudes towards the nation among older generations, but it may produce substantially different patterns of attachment among younger generations, as predicted by the famous 'impressionable years' hypothesis (Krosnick and Alwin 1989) . (Heath, Tilley and Exley 2005) . Another strong reason for using national pride to measure affective attachment to the nation is that it has been extensively used by the literature.
Equating 'pride in being Spanish' with national pride could be somewhat misleading given that certain (mainly leftist and peripheral) groups seem to hold a multinational conception of Spain and, then, by declaring their pride in being Spaniards, could be expressing pride in a (multinational) state rather than national pride. However, the consideration of Spain as a nation, as stated by the 1978 Constitution, is widely shared among Spaniards, so I assume -as the literature has done until now-that the question 'how proud are you to be Spaniard?' is measuring national pride.
Another objection that could be done to the use of national pride as a measure of attachment to the nation is that it may also be affected by period effects, given that it does not only measure the affective attachment to the nation but also, up to certain degree, an evaluation of the effective performance of the 'object'. If this is true, we should expect certain contexts (such as economic cycles, political events or sports successes, for example) to depress or exacerbate pride in one's nation, or even alter the relationship among our variables of interest and national pride. However, by asking about general national pride (and not, as in other instances, about pride in specific 
The independent variables
The variable measuring ideology is the usual ten-point scale ranging from far left to far right. Measuring the religious identification is more complex, and there are various approaches to the issue: some surveys use frequency of attendance to religious services, others ask on the importance of religion in one's life, etc. However, I use a simple question asking whether the respondent identifies as a catholic, a non-believer or a member of another religious group. Using this approach may be problematic to some extent, mainly by two reasons: it is a less fine approach to the issue (we are not able to discriminate among degrees of identification with Catholicism) and, moreover, the variation is quite reduced (on average, around 84% of Spaniards identify themselves as Catholics in the surveys used). However, I contend that using this straightforward measure is useful and interesting because it captures the subjective identification with a cultural trait that has been used as one of the main national markers by Spanish nationalism. For the shake of clarity, and given that, by the moment, the proportion of people that identifies as members of non-catholic religious groups is negligible in Spain, I dichotomise this variable in two groups: catholics and non-catholics.
To cover the regional differences, I just use dummies for those autonomous communities with a different from Spanish official language, given that it is a strong marker of cultural distinctiveness. 6 Using territorial location instead of individual traits may lead to somewhat biased results if we intend to infer the effect of cultural distinctiveness: Some of those regions are internally heterogeneous and have huge The cohort analysis is based on the cohort division proposed by Montero, Torcal and Gunther (1998, p. 36 is the democracy one, and comprises those citizens born after born after 1968.
5.-Analysis
First of all, in Table 1 I show the distribution of frequencies among the four categories in each year. As we can see, the levels of national pride in Spain are quite high, with around 80 per cent of the sample in the top two categories. There seems to be no specific trend, towards a decline or increase in aggregate levels of national pride, even if some variations may be indicating the influence of certain period effects, as I was Table 2 shows three merged models, that include several interaction terms to test the hypotheses on the evolution of the impact of religion and ideology on national pride (this method is fully described in Firebaugh WVS survey did not use the autonomous communities criteria and thus, they are not comparable. 8 Moreover, instead of using dummies for cohorts, for the shake of clarity, I
use the birth year as a continuous variable, in order to easily introduce interactions with year.
(Table 2 about here)
These three models show several interesting results. 9 The first one is that Catholicism, ideology and birth year exert a highly significant influence on national pride in the expected direction for all the models: there is a religious, ideological and generational bias in the Spanish national pride. Moreover, the coefficients of year indicate that, controlling for the other variables in the model, the overall levels of pride have been increasing in these twenty years, despite the substantial reduction in the intensity of the state-led nationalism. This may be reflecting the integration of previously alienated segments of the society. However, in order to test the hypotheses, we have to look at the interactions between year and the two main variables of interest in these models. In the second and third models I divide this 20-year period in two 10-year periods in order to approach with more refinement the dynamics of change. These results show a quite complex picture The religion 10 variable is highly significant and has a considerable influence on national pride during the whole period, being one of the most relevant factors to explain variation in pride. However, as shown by the previous models -and the coefficients of these models-, its strength has tended to weaken progressively.
To clarify the results, in the next table I show the predicted probabilities of pride for Catholics and non-Catholics, holding the other variables constant at their means:
( Table 4 about here)
In this table we can see how being catholic increases the probability of being very proud of Spain: in 1981, it was more than twice for catholics than for noncatholics. The differences have decreased slightly but still remain significant. Due to the concentration of an overwhelming majority of the sample in the top two categories, the relevant differences are located between them, so the probability for the three lower categories is always greater for the non-catholics.
The relationship between ideology and pride is more complex: it was very strong and significant at the beginning of the period (1981), in 1990 it was still significant (albeit apparently weaker) and in 1995 it had lost its significance. Later on, in 1999 and 2000 it retrieved its influence on national pride. These results are congruent with those obtained in the merged models, and seem to suggest that this relationship is mediated by period effects. I will discuss it later on. Again, the table of predicted probabilities will where the probability of being "very proud" of Spain has never been greater than 0.2, while in the rest of Spain, it has ranged among 0.47 and 0.69. The case of Catalonia is less pronounced than the Basque one, but it still shows huge differences with respect to the rest of Spain.
Cohort analysis, despite some irregularities (that might be due to the reduced N of some cohorts), suggests that cohorts that reached adulthood during the regime's crisis, the transition or after the establishment of democracy show lower levels of national pride than the older ones. A quite linear tendency emerges, each cohort being less proud that the previous one.
Due to the well-known age-period-cohort specification problem, we cannot be completely sure that this effect is not due to social ageing rather than political generations. However, there are two reasons that lead me to contend that, despite its apparent linearity, the mechanism linking birth year and national pride is not related to social ageing but rather to cohort effects dependent on different socialisation contexts:
first, a mechanism linking national pride and social ageing is much less plausible than the cohort effects, determined by the socialisation contexts, as stated by previous works (Heath, Tilley and Exley 2005) . And second, as the cohorts age they do not show a tendency of increasing national pride -nor we find a progressive convergence among them-, as can be seen in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 On the other hand, the evolution of the relationship between ideology and national pride in Spain seems to be more complex. From 1981 From , to 1990 From (and 1995 ) the process of reduction of the influence of ideology on national pride was constant, reaching a point in which it had lost its significant impact. The long-lasting left-wing governments (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) may have contributed to this process, by fostering attachment to the nation among left-wing identifiers and, perhaps, also reducing it among rightists.
However, since 1995, ideology retrieved its influence on national pride, and in This reversal of the tendency seems to indicate that the relationship between ideology and national pride is mediated by certain period effects, related to changes in the mainstream nationalist discourses following short-term political changes. This smoewhat surprising result opens room for further research on attachment to the nation, that is usually seen as rather autonomous from short-term political changes.
Finally, residence in culturally distinct territories has an uneven influence on national pride: only in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country (and the Canary This results appear to support the idea that national identities are politically and socially constructed (or 'deconstructed'), and do not derive directly from some objective ethnocultural traits of individuals. The lack of data on autonomous communities for 1981 does not allow us to test the hypotheses on the evolution of the relationship between residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country and Spanish national pride.
However, the data on 1990-2000 are clear enough in showing that, regardless of the previous evolution, this variables do exert a strong influence in depressing the average levels of pride in Spain being -especially in the Basque case-by far, the strongest predictor of national pride in the models.
We still can't be sure whether the lower pride in Spain of residents in Catalonia and the Basque Country is the product of a Spanish nationalism that, by defining in ethnocultural terms the Spanish nation, alienates them from feeling attached to it, or rather the result of the alternative nation-building set up by Basque and Catalan Further research would be needed to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions, and probably all these options are partially true. In any case, in this article I have shown that national pride is not completely autonomous from the political sphere, and that deep political changes such as a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy do modify people's attitudes towards their nation. Attachment to the nation is a political phenomenon and, as such, it is socially and politically constructed (and reconstructed): the agency of the elites, and the institutional settings, do exert a strong influence in shaping individual attitudes towards the nation, even in the short term. -Year is a dummy variable with value 1 for the first year of each model and 0 for the last one.
-McKelvey and Zavoina's R2 is the measure of goodness of fit that, in ordinal logit models, better approaches actual R2 in an OLS regression model on the underlying latent variable (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148) -I use Cohort 6 as the reference category, except for 1981, where the reference category is cohort 1 (the oldest cohort), because there are no individiduals of the youngest cohort in the sample. In the regions, I compare each of the culturally distinct regions with the rest of the state. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
